Introduction
In the field of the cognitive science of religion, it has been suggested that many cultural and more specifically religious ideas are "contagious" Sperber 1996) and enjoy a cultural transmission advantage because they appeal to the architecture of human cognition (Boyer and Ramble 2001) . One of the mechanisms involved in making religious ideas cognitively attractive seems to be related to attentional resources dedicated to those ideas, and consequently to their increased memorability (Boyer 1994 (Boyer , 2001 . It has been argued that one aspect of religious concepts which makes them more memorable is that they are © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2014 Upal et al. 2007 ). However, since many studies were focused on maximally counter-intuitive concepts and their memorability is rather well understood, we decided to focus on another aspect of concept memorability. In addition, we believe that the difference between MXCI and MCI concepts is one of quantity, merely amplifying the cognitive resources to be allocated to MXCI concepts, and thus making them more difficult to process and subsequently diminishing their memorability. Our focus therefore lied in memory for concepts quantitatively similar to MCI concepts, meaning that they do not impose greater cognitive demands to be remembered (such as in case of MXCI concepts), but with one important difference, that is violations of cultural conceptual knowledge which have been rather overlooked in the literature.
The main aim of our study was to understand how human attention and memory respond to violations of ontological versus cultural expectations. To this end we compared concepts that made similar demands on cognitive resources but varied fundamentally in terms of their quality. We used intuitive concepts as well as concepts involving two kinds of violations: those breaking intuitive ontological assumptions, and those violating culturally acquired assumptions. The latter can be understood as concepts that violate expectations with respect to their attributes, based upon our conceptual knowledge. Therefore, the fundamental distinction between intuitive and cultural expectation-violating concepts lies in the degree of their viability. Importantly, Iman and Richman (1991) showed that when processing time is limited, plausible bizarre information is remembered more than implausible bizarre information. Similarly, we do not expect a cat to start speaking because we have an intuitive understanding of ontology, and based on cats' biological properties the existence of this concept is impossible. In contrast, concepts like a wooden bottle or a blind driver violate only learned assumptions about the properties or abilities of individual concepts. Since these concepts are not impossible, we refer to them as minimally counter-schematic or cultural intuition-violating, as opposed to minimally counter-intuitive ones, which represent violation to ontological assumptions acquired early in ontogenesis (e.g., Spelke and Kinzler 2007) To maximize internal validity we controlled for various potentially confounding variables. Some of the most important factors influencing attentional (and subsequently mnemonic) preference for certain information are word length, word frequency and latency of stimulus presentation. The word frequency effect refers to the finding that high frequency words are recalled to a greater extent than low frequency words (Hall 1954; Sumby 1963 ). The effect is opposite for recognition-i.e., low frequency words are better recognized than high frequency words (Gorman 1961) . The word length effect refers to the superior immediate recall for lists of short compared with long words (Baddeley, Thomson, and © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2014 Buchanan 1975) due to the more efficient rehearsal of the former. Lastly, the effect of stimulus latency (or exposure time) on memory is also of relevance. The time dedicated to processing a certain stimulus correlates with the memory for that stimulus (for a review see Gouden and Nicolas 2012) . Our study is the first to control for all those factors in order to afford precise measurements of the memorability of MCI concepts.
Furthermore, we examined memorability for agents versus non-agents through the inclusion of individual ontological categories as suggested by Boyer (1994) . The sensitivity of the human mind towards clues related to agency (Barrett and Johnson 2003) suggests the evolutionary importance of detecting agency within the environment (Guthrie 1993) . Interestingly, studies have demonstrated an over-attribution of agency to non-agents, clearly showing evidence for the existence of a "hyperactive agency detection device" in humans (Barrett 2000 ; see also Atran 2002; Guthrie 1993 ). To our knowledge, however, memory for agents in comparison to non-agents has not been investigated beyond the demonstration of agency attribution to non-agents via minimally counter-intuitive concepts (such as an "intelligent plant").
The experiment consisted of immediate memory recall and delayed recognition tasks for three different concept categories: intuitive, cultural expectationviolating, ontological expectation-violating (MCI). Furthermore, the presence or absence of agents in each category was included by following Boyer's four different ontological categories (human, animal, plant, object). The primary aim of the study was to understand the memory for MCI concepts when faced with intuitive concepts compared with those involving violations of "cultural intuitions." Method Participants studied 48 concepts comprising three concept categories: intuitive (INT), cultural expectation-violating (EVC), and ontological expectation-violating (MCI). Memory for individual concepts was assessed twice, immediately after the initial learning phase and subsequently a month after.
Subjects. Fifty Czech undergraduate and graduate students (28 female, 22 male; age range: 20-23) participated in the study in exchange for class credit. No subjects reported memory pathologies, and all reported normal or correctedto-normal vision.
Stimuli and apparatus. Forty-eight concepts were constructed for the purpose of the experiment. Each concept consisted of an adjective and a noun. Word frequency and word length were controlled within and across all three concept categories. All concepts were presented in Czech. The experiment was programmed on MATLAB version 19.0, and carried out on a Fujitsu laptop with a © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2014 17-inch colour monitor.
The concepts were created as follows: each concept represented one concept category and one ontological category. Three different concept categories were presented:
1. Intuitive concepts (16 concepts), e.g., plastic clock 2. Ontological expectation-violating concepts (i.e., minimally counterintuitive; 16 concepts), e.g., talking cat 3. Cultural expectation-violating concepts (16 concepts), e.g. illiterate teacher
Within each concept category, four different ontological categories were included: human, animal, plant and objects.
Procedure. Prior to the experiment, subjects were told that the study concerned learning of concepts and their task would be to study all the presented concepts. The experiment consisted of two separate parts. A basic concepts learning paradigm was used, such that each subject was administered 48 concepts (16 in each category), presented randomly. Each concept was presented in white letters on a black screen individually for 1500 ms with a 500 ms interstimulus interval. After the initial learning phase, a filler task was presented for 2 mins requiring the subject to solve a range of mathematical operations comprised of simple additions, subtractions, multiplication, and division. Afterwards, subjects were prompted to recall as many concepts as possible, including both the adjective and noun, with a time limit of one minute (in general, subjects reported that time was sufficient for the recall). This sequence (learning phase, filler task, recall) was repeated in order to observe the permeability of the concepts in memory, i.e., the effect of repeated exposure on the recall of individual concepts.
In order to determine the pervasiveness of individual concepts in long-term term memory, participants were contacted one month after the initial learning phase took place. All 50 participants responded promptly and were presented with a surprise recognition test. In the task, 48 old and 48 new concepts were presented to the participants. Their task was to indicate which concepts were presented in the initial study.
The scoring of the recalled items was as following: an item was considered as correctly recalled only in the case of precise recall of both adjective and noun. Recall was scored by two independent raters. The same scoring process was applied for the recognition task, with the only difference of discounting of any false alarms of newly presented items.
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Results
We examined memory for expectation violation of various ontological categories with repeated-measures ANOVA, incorporating concept category (EVC, MCI, INT), ontological category (human, animal, plant, object), and sequence (recall 1, recall 2, one-month post-experiment recognition) as within-subject variables.
The descriptive statistics for individual variables is displayed in Table 1 . Figure 2 for memory performance in individual memory tasks (recall, recognition, and overall performance).
Overall recall Mean (SD)
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore the memorability of two different kinds of expectation-violating concepts. The results showed that in terms of concept category, concepts violating cultural expectations were better recalled in both © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2014 immediate and delayed memory tests, while concepts violating ontological expectations were better recalled in delayed recognition test when compared to intuitive concepts. Secondly, agency was an important determinant of concept memorability, since human agents in particular were resistant to forgetting compared to other ontological categories (animals, plants, and objects). Based on our results, it seems that human memory is attracted primarily to ideas that violate cultural expectancies, i.e., ideas that could potentially exist, but are not typically encountered in everyday interactions with the world (see Apendix for examples). On the other hand, ideas that violate intuitive expectancies, such as minimally counter-intuitive ideas, do not seem to enjoy an immediate memory advantage, although they are remembered better than intuitive, everyday ideas after a delay-in our study, a month after the initial presentation. Those results are in accordance with those of other studies that found minimally counterintuitive ideas persistent in memory through a delayed recall test (Boyer and Ramble 2001; Norenzayan et al. 2006) .
Expectation-violating concepts have two main characteristics: not only are they slightly bizarre-and we would expect the effects of bizarreness or distinctiveness to yield better memory for those items (Hunt 1995; Ranganath and Rainer 2003; Schmidt 1991; Waddill and McDaniel 1998) -they also refer to © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2014 the strength of the cultural associations between the adjective and the noun. For instance, consider the concept illiterate teacher: there is a strong association between being a teacher and being intelligent, or at least capable of reading and writing. This is almost a prototypical attribute of a teacher, thus the association has great strength, i.e., increased memorability. Violating this prominent attribute seems to strengthen memorability by boosting its distinctiveness/bizarreness. In the free recall test, searching for free associations between a noun and the respective adjective first produces associations that are appropriate, and thus the associative strength is high. In our case, the adjective-noun associative strength refers to the crucial attribute of the noun, but in a rather unexpected or somewhat contrary way. This, we suggest, enhances recall due to the bizarreness. Therefore, those unexpected cultural associations that occur at the adjective-noun level might serve as "mnemonic devices" resulting in greater recall for cultural expectation-violating concepts than for minimally counter-intuitive or intuitive words. A second important finding relates to memory for individual ontological categories as suggested by Boyer (1994) . Throughout all concept categories, concepts pertaining to humans were recalled better than concepts related to other, non-human ontological categories (animal, plant, object). It is not surprising that a memory preference for agents, particularly humans, was observed. First of all, humans have a tendency to detect agency even where there is none, especially in dubious situations (Barrett and Johnson 2003; Gray and Wegner 2010; Gurthrie 1980 Gurthrie , 1993 Heider and Simmel 1944; Lawson and McCauley 1990; Michotte 1962; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000) . This has led Justin Barrett to argue for the existence of a dedicated mechanism which he termed a "hyperactive agency detection device " (2000; 2004) . This tendency to over-detect agency has an adaptive function, allowing us to avoid potential misses that might threaten our survival. Similarly, information regarding agents motivates increased learning. For example, mechanisms related to the detection of cheating might enhance memory for incidents of deception in order to avoid potential future mistreatment (Bell and Buchner 2009; Mealey, Daood, and Krage 1996) . A recent study by Chang and Safley (2009) demonstrated that memory in situations of social interaction is predominantly guided by a general expectation-violation system. Therefore, it seems that human agents that have violated our expectations are particularly attention-grabbing.
We believe that our study brings important insights for understanding the role of counter-intuitiveness in memory, and potentially cultural transmission. By limiting cognitive resources that could be allotted to individual concepts, we show that both expectation-violating concept categories (MCI and EVC) enjoy a memory advantage.
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To conclude, based on our findings, it seems that concepts involving humans as well as ideas violating our expectations are cognitively more attractive, potentially due to the fact that they serve as opportunities for conceptual learning that prevent individuals from facing potential threats to their survival.
